Real Risks for Employees [Two cases]: Tipping Off and Prejudicing Investigations under POCA

05/08/2026

In the UK, EMPLOYEES face real CRIMINAL risk for TIPPING OFF and PREJUDICING INVESTIGATIONS under POCA

Regulated-sector staff (s.333A) and
ANY employee (s.342)

Two reported cases — R v Doshi (2011) under section 342 and R v Osmond (2023/2026) under section 333A demonstrate that tipping off and prejudicing an investigation offence under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 create personal criminal liability for individual employees.

R v Doshi (2011) under section 342 [ www.comsuregroup.com/news/sunderland-accountant-jailed-in-2011-for-tipping-off/ ]

and

R v Osmond (conviction 2023; Court of Appeal 2026) under section 333A. [ www.comsuregroup.com/news/the-first-solicitor-ever-prosecuted-for-tipping-off-is-suspended-for-using-the-firm-s-account-as-a-banking-facility/ ]

Both show that employees – not just firms – can end up in the criminal courts.

Prosecutions are rare, but the courts have convicted professionals who disclosed official investigation details to clients.
Silence outside strictly necessary internal channels is the safest default once an investigation or SAR becomes known.

The two offences in plain terms

Section 333A – tipping off (regulated sector only)

A person commits an offence if, in the course of a business in the regulated sector, they disclose that:

A suspicious activity report (or other disclosure under Part 7) has been made, or
An investigation into a money-laundering offence is being contemplated or is under way, and the disclosure is likely to prejudice that investigation.

The information must have come to them in the course of regulated business. Knowledge or suspicion that the disclosure is likely to prejudice the investigation is required (section 333D(4)).
Maximum penalty: two years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.

Section 342 – prejudicing an investigation (anyone)

This is broader. It applies if a person knows or suspects that an appropriate officer is conducting (or about to conduct) a confiscation, civil recovery, money-laundering or related investigation, and they either:

Make a disclosure likely to prejudice it, or
Falsify, conceal, destroy or dispose of relevant documents.

Again, there is a defence if the person did not know or suspect that the disclosure would prejudice the investigation.
Maximum penalty: five years’ imprisonment and/or a fine.

Overlap but distinct.

The two offences overlap in practice but are distinct. Section 333A is limited to the regulated sector; section 342 is not.

These remain the clearest reported examples.

Prosecutions under either section are uncommon, but the absence of a large body of case law does not reduce the risk.
Both defendants were professionals who claimed they did not fully appreciate the confidentiality requirement.
Both were convicted.

The reported cases.

R v Doshi [2011] EWCA Crim 1975

Kishor Doshi, a director of a Sunderland accountancy firm, received a production order requiring him to hand over a client’s accounts in a Northumbria Police money-laundering investigation.
Within hours he telephoned the client and told him about the order. He was convicted under section 342(2).
He claimed he thought it was a civil HMRC matter and did not realise the order had to remain confidential.
The jury disagreed. He received 18 months’ imprisonment (reduced to 12 months on appeal).
Contemporary reporting described him as the first person convicted under POCA for potentially prejudicing a covert money-laundering inquiry.
Full judgment: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2011/1975.html

R v William Osmond [2026] EWCA Crim 979

William Osmond, a solicitor and senior partner, received a confidential request for information from the Serious Fraud Office about a client’s involvement in a property transaction linked to a wider money-laundering investigation.
He disclosed the existence of the SFO enquiry to the client and discussed it over several months.
He was also convicted of forgery in relation to a letter of engagement. The jury convicted him of tipping off under section 333A(3).
He received nine months’ imprisonment suspended for 18 months.
The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal in July 2026 and noted that this was the first case about the tipping-off provisions in section 333A(3) to reach that court. It therefore gave leave for the judgment to be cited.
Judgment available at: https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/crim/2026/979
Commentary confirming its status as the first reported analysis of the elements of the offence:

Risks to all employees

The offences create personal criminal liability. Key points for staff:

You do not need to intend to help a criminal.

The focus is on whether the disclosure was likely to prejudice the investigation and whether you knew or suspected that likelihood.

“I didn’t realise it was confidential” is not a reliable defence.

Production orders, SFO notices and similar requests routinely warn recipients of the tipping-off / prejudicing offences. Courts expect regulated professionals to read and understand them.

Section 333A catches regulated-sector employees.

Solicitors, accountants, bankers, estate agents, tax advisers and others in the regulated sector are squarely in scope. The information need only have come to you “in the course of a business in the regulated sector”.

Section 342 catches everyone.

It is not limited to the regulated sector. Any employee who becomes aware of a relevant investigation and discloses it in a way likely to prejudice that investigation can be charged.

Conversations with clients, colleagues outside the need-to-know circle, family or third parties can all engage the offences.

Casual remarks, emails, or “keeping the client in the loop” are enough if the statutory elements are met.

Internal disclosures are not automatically safe.

While there are limited permitted disclosures within an undertaking or group (sections 333B–333C), these are tightly drawn. Uncontrolled internal chatter still creates risk.

Document interference is separately criminal under section 342.

Destroying, altering or concealing records relevant to an investigation is an independent route to liability.

The practical consequence is straightforward: once you become aware of a:

SAR, a production order, an SFO or police notice, or any other indicator of an investigation, the default position is silence outside the strictly necessary internal channels.
Explaining delays to a client, “managing the relationship”, or assuming the investigation is already public does not provide a safe harbour unless the specific statutory defences are met on the facts.

Practical steps for firms and staff:

Treat every official request for information that carries a confidentiality warning as a red-flag event. Escalate immediately to the MLRO or nominated officer.
Train staff that “I thought the client had a right to know” is not a defence.
Maintain clear internal protocols for handling SARs, production orders and investigatory notices so that only those who need to know are informed.
Document decisions about what can and cannot be said to clients.
Remember that good character evidence and claims of ignorance did not prevent conviction in either Doshi or Osmond.

These offences exist to protect the integrity of investigations. The reported cases demonstrate that the courts will enforce them against individual professionals. The low number of prosecutions should not be mistaken for low risk.

For any employee who handles client information, SARs or official requests, the personal stakes are real.

End

Primary case sources

https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ewca/crim/2026/979 (R v William Osmond [2026] EWCA Crim 979 – full Court of Appeal judgment)
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2011/1975.html (R v Doshi [2011] EWCA Crim 1975 – full Court of Appeal judgment)

Key commentary and reporting on Osmond

Key reporting on Doshi

Legislation

Additional useful context / guidance pages referenced

Read on

R v Osmond [2026]: a closer look at the "tipping off" offence under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002

Posted on 31 July 2026 https://www.mishcon.com/news/r-v-osmond-2026-a-closer-look-at-the-tipping-off-offence-under-the-proceeds-of-crime-act-2002 = Reading time 10 minutes

In brief:

R v Osmond is the first reported case which considers the elements of the tipping off offence under Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 ('POCA 2002').
The judgment is a helpful clarification – and confirmation – of the scope of the offence for individuals and businesses in the regulated sector who may become aware of investigations into their clients.
Although the judgment leaves open the prospect that a tipping off offence may not be committed where the investigation is already in the public domain, this will be highly fact-specific.
The judgment also confirms that information leading to a tipping off offence is not restricted to information received in the course of providing a regulated service to a client; it is enough that information is received by the individual in their capacity as "a person carrying on business in the regulated sector".

The offence of "tipping off"

Section 333A(3) of POCA 2002 provides that a person commits an offence if:

The person discloses that an investigation into allegations of an offence under Part 7 of POCA 2002 is being contemplated or is being carried out;
The disclosure is likely to prejudice the investigation; and
The information which the disclosure is based on came to the person in the course of a business in the regulated sector.

In regard to (b), it is not necessary that the disclosure actually prejudices the investigation, but only that prejudice is "likely". It is also not a defence if no prejudice is caused by the disclosure.

In regard to (c), the requirement is that information is obtained in the "regulated sector". For the purpose of R v Osmond, the regulated conduct was "the participation in financial or real property transactions", which explicitly includes "the buying and selling of real property […] or business entities".

The mental element required for a tipping off offence is found in:

Section 333D(4): a person does not commit a tipping off offence if the person "does not know or suspect that the disclosure is likely to have the effect mentioned in section 333A(3)(b)", i.e. of prejudicing the relevant investigation.

Case background:

Mr William Osmond was the senior partner of a law firm, Osmond and Osmond Solicitors. In 2013, Mr Osmond acted for his long-standing client, Mr James Ramsay, when he provided a £4 million loan, which the borrower put towards a purchase of an £8 million residential property in Mayfair. As Mr Ramsay routed this loan through an offshore company, Mr Osmond dealt with the purchase of a new "off-the-shelf" British Virgin Islands company through which to grant the loan. Mr Osmond also prepared the relevant loan documentation. The £4 million was then paid into Mr Osmond's client account and transferred onwards to the borrower and purchaser of the residential property.
Mr Ramsay's £4 million loan came to the attention of the Serious Fraud Office ('SFO') during its investigation into a company called Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Limited ('ENRC'). This investigation began in 2013 and was prompted by allegations of fraud, corruption and money laundering. During the SFO's investigation, it transpired that the recipient of Mr Ramsay's loan and purchaser of the £8 million Mayfair property was the wife of a senior ENRC official and daughter of one of ENRC's founders.
On 7 June 2018, Mr Osmond received a call from an SFO investigator regarding the Mayfair property purchase; Mr Osmond was requested to provide documents related to the loan transaction, details of his client relationship with Mr Ramsay and details of the explanation given by Mr Ramsay for contributing to the borrower's purchase price. The SFO investigator followed up with Mr Osmond in writing on 15 June 2018, sharing a formal notice under the Criminal Justice Act 1987 (CJA 1987), with more detailed requests and questions which could assist the ENRC investigation. Unbeknownst to the SFO investigator, Mr Osmond had at this stage already telephoned Mr Ramsay on 8 June 2018 about the SFO's enquiries and travelled to Malta (Mr Ramsay's country of residence) on 14 June 2018 and returned to the UK the following day.
At first instance, Mr Osmond was also found guilty of forgery under section 1 of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 ('F&CA 1981'). This arose because, when asked by the SFO investigator to provide a copy of the engagement letter provided to Mr Ramsay for the loan transaction, Mr Osmond created a false letter of engagement back-dated to five years prior – 24 October 2013 – and provided this to the SFO. On the contrary, no such engagement letter existed between Mr Osmond and Mr Ramsay at the relevant time.

Trial

The issues at trial in Mr Osmond's case broadly fell under three categories:

Investigation in public domain: At first instance, an argument was made on Mr Osmond's behalf that his disclosure of information related to the SFO's enquiries was not capable of prejudicing the investigation because the ENRC investigation was already widely publicised and inevitably already known to Mr Ramsay (and anyone connected with ENRC). The prosecution's position was that the "investigation" capable of being prejudiced was not the entire ENRC investigation, but rather a separate investigation in relation to the Mayfair property purchase which Mr Ramsay provided financing for.

HHJ Trowler KC made a pre-trial ruling in favour of the prosecution, finding that "there is no sensible basis on which it can be argued that a person cannot commit the offence of 'tipping off' simply because the broader investigation is already
known to the relevant parties".
Context of receiving information: An argument was also made at first instance that the information about the investigation into the property purchase was not received by Mr Osmond "in the course of his business in the regulated sector" – rather, he had received information about an already well-known investigation from a prosecuting authority exercising its powers under section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 ('CJA 1987'). The prosecution's position was that Mr Osmond received the information in the course of his business as a lawyer, being a business in the regulated sector, and asked questions in his capacity as Mr Ramsay's solicitor.

On this point, HHJ Trowler KC made a pre-trial ruling in favour of the prosecution's position. To the question whether the information came to Mr Osmond in the course of a business in the regulated sector, she ruled: "in my view […] the only possible answer to this question is 'yes'."
Duty of recipient of forged letter: With regards to the forgery offence, Mr Osmond's counsel argued that the engagement letter was not received by the SFO investigator "in connection with his performance of any duty" (a requirement of the offence under section 10 of the F&CA 1981); rather, the SFO had a power to carry out an investigation but no duty to do so. This was rejected by the Judge at first instance on the basis that the SFO investigator had a duty to his employer to carry out the investigation.

In relation to the tipping off offence, the jury were then directed that a tipping off offence will have occurred if the jury was sure that: (i) Mr Osmond disclosed an SFO investigation into the Mayfair property purchase to Mr Ramsay; (ii) the disclosure was likely to prejudice the investigation; (iii) Mr Osmond knew or suspected prejudice was likely to be caused; and (iv) the information related to the disclosure was likely to have the prejudicial effect in question.

The jury convicted Mr Osmond on both counts of tipping off and forgery. He was later sentenced to nine months' imprisonment suspended for 18 months.

Appeal

The application for leave to appeal on Mr Osmond's behalf argued that the following matters for the jury were unfairly narrowed by HHJ Trowler KC:

The information had come to Mr Osmond from the prosecuting authority – not in the course of a business in the regulated sector. This was contrary to the purpose of Part 7 of POCA 2002, which was intended to criminalise a situation where Mr Osmond himself made a report to a designated authority and thereafter informed Mr Ramsay of his own report.
It was for the jury to decide what the SFO investigation was and whether the Mayfair property purchase investigation was merely a part of the already well-known ENRC investigation. Had the jury found that the property purchase investigation was part of the wider ENRC investigation, then the jury's decision as to the likelihood of prejudice arising as a result of the investigation would have been different.

In respect of (a), the Court of Appeal found that Mr Osmond was "undoubtedly" a business in the regulated sector and the source of the information given to Mr Osmond was immaterial to the tipping off offence:

"51. The fact that the information about the SFO investigation came from the SFO does not assist the defence. That is precisely what paragraph (c) of subsection (3) is directed towards. Its objective is to prevent a person carrying on business in the regulated sector from tipping off their client that an investigation by the SFO or other agency is under way. The subsection is not concerned with the source of the information (which will typically be the SFO or other investigating agency) but with the capacity in which the defendant receives it."

In respect of (b), the Court of Appeal found that "there is no reason why an investigation should not be capable of being the subject of a disclosure under section 333A(3) even if that investigation is also an aspect of (or strand within) a wider investigation". It followed that the SFO were entitled to advance a case that the relevant investigation was in relation to the Mayfair property transaction, rather than the wider ENRC investigation. The Court noted that any case advanced on the basis that the relevant investigation for the purposes of section 333A(3) was the ENRC investigation – which was in the public domain and known to Mr Ramsay - 'would have been bound to fail.'

In relation to the forgery conviction, the Court of Appeal also rejected an argument on Mr Osmond's behalf that it should have been open to the jury to conclude that the SFO investigator was not performing any relevant duty when he received the engagement letter.

Accordingly, the Court refused leave to appeal, but, as the case represented the first occasion the tipping off provisions had been considered by the Court of Appeal, gave leave for the judgment to be cited and reported.

Key observations:

The tipping-off offence in the regulated sector under s.333A POCA, together with the broader offence of prejudicing a money laundering investigation under s.342 POCA, has long created a difficult tension for professionals who have submitted a Defence Against Money Laundering (DAML) request or Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) and are subsequently unable to explain the resulting delay to their client. The judgment in R v Osmond serves to underscore the importance the risks associated with disclosure to a client in the context of a potential money laundering investigation.

Although individuals in regulated sectors may take comfort from the finding in the judgment that a tipping off offence may not be committed where the investigation is already in the public domain and known to an individual, this should be approached with caution. The reality of money laundering investigations is that it will seldom be possible for any third party to be confident as to the scope or substance of the investigation, particularly in complex or long-running investigations with multiple strands.

In practice, the safest course remains to assume that any disclosure of an investigation to a client carries a risk of prejudice, however public the wider matter may appear, and to apply caution or seek advice before communicating with a client whose conduct is under scrutiny.

SAR/STR MLRO LEGAL UNITED KINGDOM

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