News
JERSEY
MONEY LAUNDERING
ASK MAT
AML CODES
JFSC
news image Published on : 17/11/2026

Ask Mat: Can “reasonable grounds” alone make you a money launderer in Jersey?

Insta Autumn Lawn Care (2)

The JFSC Handbook suggests it can. The wording of the Proceeds of Crime (Jersey) Law 1999 appears to point the other way.

  • Section 9.2.3.3 of the JFSC AML/CFT/CPF Handbook (effective 31 October 2026) suggests a person can commit a money laundering offence on reasonable grounds alone, even if they never actually knew or suspected anything.

    • For terrorist financing, that’s correct.

  • For money laundering under the Proceeds of Crime (Jersey) Law 1999, it appears to be inconsistent with the statute.

  • Where guidance and statute differ, the statute controls.

  • Firms train staff from the Handbook, MLROs make decisions using it, and the courts take it into account.

  • So the inconsistency matters.

What the Handbook says

Paragraph 74 says Articles 30 and 31 of the Proceeds of Crime Law, read with Article 29 and with Articles 15 and 16 of the Terrorism Law, “provide for an offence to be committed” when dealing with, using or concealing property where there are reasonable grounds to know or suspect that it is criminal or terrorist property.

Paragraph 75 says: “This means that a person would commit an offence even if they did not know or suspect”, judged by whether a reasonable person in a similar business would have suspected.

It could be argued that paragraph 74 is describing how suspicion is proved, not the fault element of the offence. Paragraph 75 rules that reading out. It is the Handbook’s own explanation of paragraph 74, and it describes liability without knowledge or suspicion.

This isn’t new wording. The same two paragraphs appeared as paragraphs 72 and 73 of Section 8 in the Handbook version effective 1 July 2023. The wording has been renumbered and carried forward without change.

What the Proceeds of Crime Law says

Article 29(1) defines criminal property by reference to the alleged offender’s own state of mind. It covers property derived from criminal conduct, and property used or intended to be used in it, if the alleged offender knows or suspects that this is so. Both limbs contain that requirement.

Article 30 (acquiring, using, possessing or controlling criminal property, and arrangements) and Article 31 (concealing, disguising, converting, transferring or removing it from Jersey) rest on that definition. Because the mental element is built into the definition, the wording of Articles 29 to 31 appears to require actual knowledge or suspicion.

What about “includes”?

Article 29(1) says criminal property “includes” such property; it doesn’t say “means”. “Includes” can enlarge a definition.

But even if Article 29 is not exhaustive, nothing else in Articles 29 to 31 provides another definition of criminal property that does without knowledge or suspicion.

The legislative history points firmly the same way:

  1. 2014: when Article 29 was substituted in 2014, it was a closed test. Property was criminal property if it was proceeds of criminal conduct and the alleged offender knew or suspected so.

  2. March 2018: the Draft Proceeds of Crime (Amendment No. 3) (Jersey) Law was lodged as P.64/2018. Its new Article 29(1) used “includes” and added property used, or intended to be used, in criminal conduct. Neither limb contained any knowledge or suspicion wording. That draft was withdrawn.

  3. June 2018: the draft was re-lodged as P.75/2018. This time, both limbs expressly included “if the alleged offender knows or suspects”. The Human Rights Notes in the Appendix, under the heading “Article 29”, explain that the amendment expands the definition to include property used, or intended to be used, in criminal conduct. They then state: “It does not change the mental element required for the offence.” The States adopted P.75/2018 on 26 June 2018, and it came into force on 26 October 2018 as L.30/2018.

The States therefore considered a version that used “includes” without repeating the fault element, but adopted a different version that expressly incorporated “knows or suspects” into both limbs, with a statement that the mental element was unchanged. “Includes” was used to widen the kinds of property covered. Reading it as a way to lower the fault element would cut against the legislative record.

The legislature knew how to write an objective test

  • Where the legislature wanted reasonable grounds to be enough, it said so expressly, in the same framework:

  • Proceeds of Crime Law, Article 34D: failing to report knowledge, suspicion or reasonable grounds for suspicion that comes to someone in the course of financial services business. That’s a reporting offence, with a maximum of 5 years’ imprisonment (Art 34D(10)). It isn’t a laundering offence.

  • Proceeds of Crime Law, Article 30(7)(b): the adequate-consideration defence is lost where the supplier knows, suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that its property or services may help criminal conduct. This takes away a defence; it doesn’t create the offence.

  • Terrorism Law, Article 15(2): possessing, providing, collecting or receiving property while knowing, suspecting or having reasonable grounds to suspect that it may be used for terrorism.

  • Terrorism Law, Article 16: facilitating the keeping or control of terrorist property. The defendant has to prove they did not know, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect.

  • Terrorism Law, Article 16A: insurers paying in response to terrorist demands, where they know or have reasonable cause to suspect.

Different words in the same statutory scheme are normally taken to be deliberate. The objective test already has a home chosen by the legislature: reporting, terrorist financing, and the narrow defence in Article 30(7)(b). It isn’t in the definition of criminal property.

So for terrorist financing, paragraphs 74 and 75 are right. For money laundering, they’re hard to reconcile with Articles 29 to 31.

Where the Handbook wording probably comes from

Before 4 August 2014, Jersey’s money laundering offences were in Articles 32 to 34 of the Proceeds of Crime Law. In the last version before the rewrite (showing the law as at 2 January 2014):

  • Old Article 32 (assisting another to retain the benefit of criminal conduct) required knowing or suspecting.

  • Old Article 33 (acquisition, possession or use) required knowledge only.

  • Old Article 34(2) (concealing or transferring another’s proceeds) was the only reasonable-grounds offence. It also required the purpose of helping someone avoid prosecution or confiscation. It matched the concealment offence in Article 30(2) of the Drug Trafficking Offences (Jersey) Law 1988.

The Proceeds of Crime and Terrorism (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Jersey) Law 2014 came into force on 4 August 2014. It replaced Articles 29 to 34 with today’s criminal property offences and repealed the Drug Trafficking Offences Law. From then on, reasonable grounds was no longer the test for any laundering offence. The 2014 Law kept the phrase in one place only: Article 30(7)(b), where it takes away a defence.

Paragraph 74 therefore appears to combine the current Terrorism Law test with an old concealment test that has been repealed. Even before 2014, reasonable grounds was never the test for acquiring, possessing or using criminal proceeds.

“Should have known” is not a safe harbour

On the statutory wording, a person who merely should have known, but did not actually know or suspect, doesn’t commit an offence under Article 30 or 31. In practice, two things narrow that gap:

  • Wilful blindness. The Handbook itself (paragraph 68) notes the suggestion that deliberately shutting one’s eyes to the truth may amount to knowledge. Someone who deliberately doesn’t ask the obvious question is not the same as someone who honestly missed it.

  • How suspicion is proved. Whether a person suspected is a question of fact, usually inferred from the circumstances. Strong reasonable grounds don’t replace actual suspicion, but they are often the evidence a court relies on to find that it existed.

The right message for staff is not “you’re safe if you didn’t suspect”. It’s this: the law asks what you actually suspected, and a court will judge that from what was in front of you.

What the regulated sector changes, and what it doesn’t

Being in the regulated sector does not change the mental element of the laundering offences. Articles 30 and 31 require actual knowledge or suspicion for everyone.

It does add four other layers of criminal exposure, all under the Proceeds of Crime Law:

  1. Failure to report (POCL Art 34D). Knowing, suspecting or having reasonable grounds to suspect, in the course of financial services business, and not reporting to the FIU or nominated officer as soon as practicable. Up to 5 years’ imprisonment. The training defence in Art 34D(6) is narrow: it helps only an untrained employee who did not actually know or suspect. Outside financial services business, the general duty in Article 34A applies only to actual knowledge or suspicion (Article 34C).

  2. Failure to prevent (POCL Art 35A). Inserted by the Proceeds of Crime (Amendment No. 7) (Jersey) Law 2022, in force 24 June 2022. A financial services business commits an offence if a person associated with it is engaged in money laundering, whether or not that person is convicted. Associated persons expressly include customers and their agents (Art 35A(4)(d)). The firm’s own state of mind is irrelevant. Its only defence is to prove adequate prevention procedures (Art 35A(2)).

  3. Failure to comply with the Money Laundering Order (POCL Art 37(4)). The Money Laundering (Jersey) Order 2008 is made under Article 37 of the Proceeds of Crime Law. Article 37(4) makes it a criminal offence for a person subject to the Order to contravene, or fail to comply with, any requirement in it. Examples include appointing a compliance officer and a reporting officer (Order Arts 7 and 8), policies, procedures and training (Art 11), customer due diligence (Art 13), record keeping (Arts 19 and 20) and reporting procedures (Art 21). The penalty is a fine for a body corporate, and up to 2 years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both for anyone else (POCL Art 37(7)). It’s a defence to prove that all reasonable steps were taken and all due diligence exercised (POCL Art 37(10)).

  4. Liability of officers (POCL Art 39A). Where a financial services business commits an offence with the consent or connivance of a director, partner, manager or statutory officer, that person is also guilty. Statutory officers include the people the business must appoint under the Money Laundering Order, such as the MLRO and MLCO.

The correct position: three tests, not one:

  1. Money laundering (Proceeds of Crime Law, Articles 29 to 31): subjective, for everyone. The person must actually know or suspect.

  2. Terrorist financing (Terrorism Law, Articles 15 and 16): objective. Knowing, suspecting or having reasonable grounds to suspect is enough. Under Article 16, the defendant carries the burden of proving the defence.

  3. Regulated-sector duties (Proceeds of Crime Law, Articles 34D, 35A, 37(4) and 39A): objective or organisational. Failing to report on reasonable grounds (Art 34D), failing to prevent money laundering by an associated person (Art 35A), and failing to comply with a requirement of the Money Laundering Order (Art 37(4)) are all offences under the Proceeds of Crime Law. None of them depends on the firm knowing or suspecting anything. Officers who consent to or connive in the firm’s offence are personally liable (Art 39A).

Why the Handbook’s accuracy matters in court

The Proceeds of Crime Law tells the courts to consider the JFSC’s Codes of Practice and guidance in three places:

  • Article 34D(7) (failure to report): in deciding whether the offence was committed, the court shall take account of the relevant Codes of Practice and guidance issued by the supervisory body.

  • Article 37(8) (compliance with the Money Laundering Order): in deciding whether a requirement was complied with, the court shall take account of them.

  • Article 35A(6) (failure to prevent): in deciding whether prevention procedures were adequate, the court may take account of them.

None of these applies to the laundering offences in Articles 30 and 31. But paragraphs 74 and 75 sit in Section 9 of the Handbook, which is the reporting guidance a court is required to consider under Article 34D(7). Guidance a court must read should state the law accurately, including the parts it doesn’t directly govern.

Suggested fix

I’d invite the JFSC to redraft paragraphs 74 and 75 to separate these tests, and in particular to:

  • Confirm that the money laundering offences in Articles 30 and 31 need knowledge or suspicion (Article 29);

  • Keep the reasonable-grounds test for the terrorist financing offences in Articles 15 and 16; and

  • Explain that, for money laundering, the objective test applies through Article 34D (failure to report), with Article 35A (failure to prevent) and Article 37(4) (failure to comply with the Money Laundering Order) covering the firm.

Why this hasn’t been tested

I’ve found no Royal Court decision that reads a reasonable-grounds test into Article 29. The wording of Articles 29 to 31 appears to require actual knowledge or suspicion, and there’s no obvious textual basis for importing the separate reasonable-grounds test found elsewhere in the legislation. In practice, the issue matters more than it might seem. The Handbook wording has survived renumbering and at least one full revision, which suggests it has never been formally challenged, or that many users treat the Handbook as a full statement of the law without checking the statute. For prosecution, defence and compliance purposes, the statute controls.

Feedback

I’d welcome your views, and I’ll update this article if there’s an answer to share.

Sources

JFSC Handbook

Current Jersey legislation

Legislative history: 2014 and earlier

JERSEY MONEY LAUNDERING ASK MAT AML CODES JFSC

The Team

Meet the team of industry experts behind Comsure

Find out more

Latest News

Keep up to date with the very latest news from Comsure

Find out more

Gallery

View our latest imagery from our news and work

Find out more

News Disclaimer

As well as owning and publishing Comsure's copyrighted works, Comsure wishes to use the copyright-protected works of others. To do so, Comsure is applying for exemptions in the UK copyright law. There are certain very specific situations where Comsure is permitted to do so without seeking permission from the owner. These exemptions are in the copyright sections of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (as amended)[www.gov.UK/government/publications/copyright-acts-and-related-laws]. Many situations allow for Comsure to apply for exemptions. These include 1] Non-commercial research and private study, 2] Criticism, review and reporting of current events, 3] the copying of works in any medium as long as the use is to illustrate a point. 4] no posting is for commercial purposes [payment]. (for a full list of exemptions, please read here www.gov.uk/guidance/exceptions-to-copyright]. Concerning the exceptions, Comsure will acknowledge the work of the source author by providing a link to the source material. Comsure claims no ownership of non-Comsure content. The non-Comsure articles posted on the Comsure website are deemed important, relevant, and newsworthy to a Comsure audience (e.g. regulated financial services and professional firms [DNFSBs]). Comsure does not wish to take any credit for the publication, and the publication can be read in full in its original form if you click the articles link that always accompanies the news item. Also, Comsure does not seek any payment for highlighting these important articles. If you want any article removed, Comsure will automatically do so on a reasonable request if you email info@comsuregroup.com.  

Archived News

To find our older articles, please click here.

View archive