



This <mark>3 HOUR</mark> presentation has been designed as an "AWARENESS" and "REFRESHER" session.

It **MUST NOT** be treated as an **EXHAUSTIVE** AND/OR **COMPLETE** presentation on **ALL RISKS** associated with money laundering, terrorist financing, proliferation financing, targeted UK & UN sanctions and/or other related crimes.



































































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- Technical Assessment: This is an evaluation of the technical compliance of a country's legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks with the FATF Recommendations. It assesses whether the necessary laws, regulations, and other measures are in force and effect, that is, whether the necessary formal prerequisites to an effective AML/CFT system are in place.
- Effectiveness Assessment: This is an assessment of the effectiveness with which a country's AML/CFT system is working. It evaluates the extent to which a country achieves a defined set of outcomes that are central to a robust AML/CFT system and whether it is making good use of its technical compliance with the FATF Recommendations.
- In other words, the technical assessment looks at the "what" (what measures are in place), while the effectiveness assessment looks at the "how" (how well the measures are working).

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
Immediate Outcomes	Features of an effective system
101	Properly identify, assess and understand ML/TF risks, and co-ordinate domestically to put in place actions to mitigate these risks.
10 2	The country provides constructive and limely information or assistance when requested by other countries. Competent authorities assist with requests to: locate and endratic criminals, and densify freeze, sceles, conflicate and share assets and provide information (including evidence, financial intelligence, supervisor) and benefula of monthmini instato IMUTE associated perdicate differences.
137	Supervisors appropriately supervise, monitor and regulate Fis, DNFBPs and VASPs for compliance with AML/CFT requirements commensurate with their risks
10.4	Financial institutions, DNFBPs and VASPs adequately apply AML/CFT preventive measures commensurate with their risks, and report suspicious transaction
10.5	Legal persons and arrangements are prevented from misuse for money laundering or terrorist financing, and information on their beneficial ownership is available to competent authorities without impediments.
10.6	Financial intelligence and all other relevant information are appropriately used by competent authorities for money laundering and terrorist financing investigations.
17	Money laundering offences and activities are investigated, and offenders are prosecuted and subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
10.8	Proceeds and instrumentalities of crime are confiscated.
10.9	Terrorist financing offences and activities are investigated and persons who finance terrorism are prosecuted and subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions.
IO 10	Terrorists, terrorist organisations and terrorist financiers are prevented from raising, moving and using funds, and from abusing the NPO sector.
10 11	Persons and entities involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are prevented from raising, moving and using funds, consistent with the relevant UNSCRs.








Recommendation	Outcome	Recommendation	Outcome	Recommendation	Outcome		
1	Compliant	5	Largely Compliant	29	Larpely Compliant	1	
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3	Largely Compliant	2	Largely Compliant	31	Compliant		
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5	Compliant	19	Compliant	33	Compliant		
6	Largely Compliant	20	Compliant	34	Compliant		
7	Largely Compliant	21	Compliant	35	Compliant		
8	Compliant	22	Largely Compliant	36	Compliant		
	Compliant	23	Largely Compliant	37	Compliant		
10	Largely Compliant	24	Largely Compliant	38	Compliant.		
	Compliant	25	Largely Compliant	33	Compliant		
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8	Compliant	27	Compliant				
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						Non-Cor Partially	cal Compliance





















NRA = 6 + 1 PF = 7 Comst	Jre
Jersey's National Strategy for Combatting Financial Crime Jersey's Statement on Financial Services and Financial Crime: Activities Appetite and Mitigation	<u>, Risk</u>
National Risk Assessment: Legal Persons and Arrangements (2023) National Risk Assessment: Money Laundering (2020)	
National Risk Assessment: Money Laundering (2023) National Risk Assessment: Non-Profit Organisations (2021)	
National Risk Overview: Virtual Asset Service Providers (2022)	= 2 ND
Virtual Asset Service Providers National Risk Assessment (2024)	
































.2.3 What cor	istitutes knowledge o	or suspicion
uidance notes		
undunce notes		
Facts a	nd knowledge come to the attention of a perso	n
	may lead to	
Suspicion	Knowledge	
Subjective test dore than fanciful and more than u sague feeling of unease State of mind-not necessarily well founded suspicion-need not ze justifiable for uneed not ask yourself if it is bectively reasonable	Subjective test The ability for an individual to detect criminal activity will depend on the training and experience that the specific person had at the time knowledge came to their attention Actual knowledge	
u need not ask yourself if it is	came to their attention	






























- property that is intended to be used, or is likely to be used, directly or indirectly,
- for the purposes of terrorism or to support a terrorist entity
- This includes any funds, financial services, or economic resources that could be utilized in terrorist



































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
- hold an account of a DESIGNATED PERSON and/or
- enter into dealings or agreements with a DESIGNATED PERSON, and/or
- are approached by or on behalf of a person acting for a DESIGNATED PERSON and/or
- The **DESIGNATED PERSON** has committed an offence under the sanctions regime.

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DESIGNATED PERSON

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- Under the Sanctions and Asset-Freezing (Jersey) Law 2019, a designated person (INDIVIDUALS, ENTITIES, OR GROUPS) is someone who has been identified and listed for sanctions due to their involvement in activities that <u>Invester international</u> beace and security, human rights violations, or other serious concerns
- Designated persons are subject to:
- ASSET FREEZES: Their funds and economic resources are frozen.
- RESTRICTIONS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES: Prohibitions on making funds or financial services available to them.
- RESTRICTIONS ON ECONOMIC RESOURCES: Prohibitions on making economic resources available to them
- Designated persons can include INDIVIDUALS, ENTITIES, OR GROUPS involved in:
 - · Terrorism.
 - · Human rights abuses.
 - Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction





JERSEY & UK ALIGN WITH CANADA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, & NORWAY, Sanctioned under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime • Itamar Ben-Gvir and • Bezalel Yoel Smotrich These sanctions were imposed due to their involvement in serious HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES against Palestinian individuals in the West Bank.

Details of Sanctions

Asset freezes: Their funds and economic resources are frozen
Prohibitions on financial services: Restrictions on making funds or financial services available to them

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Trade Sanctions

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These sanctions restrict trade activities with certain countries or entities to prevent WE, PROLIFERATION, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, OR OTHER HARMFUL ACTIVITIES.

They include:

Arms Embargoes

- Prohibitions on exporting or importing arms and related materials to or from sanctioned countries
- Trade Restrictions:
 - Restrictions on specific goods and services: Limiting the trade of certain items, such as dual-use goods that can be used for both civilian and military purposes
- Transport Sanctions:
 - Restrictions on aircraft and shipping: Preventing the use of UK ports and airspace by designated ships and aircraft



















SARS JERSEY POLICE SAID o 'We'd particularly like to thank the Jersey businesses • Who were alert to the signs of money laundering and raised the alarm.

• We all have a responsibility to look out for suspicious activity.'

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VAT Evasion in the UK

Martin John Hill was sentenced to 30 months in prison in 2019 for three charges of:-

- VAT evasion &
- Under-declaring sales, &



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• Pocketing the VAT charged to guests at the Burlington Hotel in Sandown and the Shanklin Beach Hotel on the Isle of Wight between 2014 and 2016

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
MONEY LAUNDERING IN JERSEY.

laundering in Jersey IN 2024.

1. Martin John Hill, a 56-year-old hotelier based in Alicante, Spain, was prosecuted for money



- 2. Hill used a Jersey bank account [Santander International] to hide money obtained through tax fraud in the UK.
- 3. Hill pleaded guilty to six counts of money laundering in Jersey's Royal Court in September 2024
- Hill was ordered to be <u>extradited to Jersey</u> for sentencing after he refused to travel to the island

































$\mathbf{1}^{st}$ TA CASE IN THE UK

British-Nigerian art dealer Ochuko Ojiri pleads guilty to funding terrorism




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- admitted failing to report high-value sales to a man suspected of financing the terrorist group Hezbollah.
- Oghenochuko Ojiri, 53, pleaded guilty to eight offences under section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000 during a hearing at Westminster Magistrates' Court.
- The legislation makes it an offence not to alert police if someone knows or suspects a business associate of being involved in financing a proscribed group.


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


















JULY 2019 SANNE: Fined £381,010	MAY 2020 Equity Trust: Fined £115,575.00
FEB 2021 Kleinwort Hambros group Fined £719,451.21 SGKH Bank - £510,599.67 SGKH Trust - £155,476.54 SGKH Corporate - £53,375	JULY 2022 IQ EQ (Jersey) Limited: Fined £803,661.17 20 September 2024 BELASKO JERSEY LIMITED
AUGUST 2022 Lloyds Bank Corporate Markets Pic, Jersey Branch (LBCM, Jersey Branch) Fined £498,000.00	£19,211.73 8 November 2024 Post Office Limited £0.00





Comsure A specific customer who was considered <u>HIGH-RISK</u> because the BENEFICIAL OWNER was


- A POLITICALLY EXP ON (PEP)
- FROM A HIGH-RISK JURISDICTION (RUSSIA) •
- WITH CONNECTIONS TO THE OIL AND GAS SECTOR AND .
- . A \$100 MILLION TRANSACTION

Additionally, the beneficial owner

. indirectly held shares in an entity subject to OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) sanctions

Against the above, Belasko failed to adequately assess and mitigate these heightened financial crime risks as outlined in the JFSC statement.....









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8 fails [1 to 4]

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- Board Administration: The JPL Board did not operate with formally approved Terms of Reference and held infrequent meetings. Discussions on compliance were limited and did not cover all regulatory responsibilities.
- Board Effectiveness: The Board demonstrated inadequate knowledge of regulatory requirements and over-relied on an ineffective compliance function. They did not self-identify issues or review the effectiveness of their compliance function.
- Risk Management: JPL's Business Risk Assessment (BRA) was inadequate, containing outdated information and failing to assess all relevant risks.
- Systems and Controls: JPL lacked written policies and procedures to comply with legal obligations and the MSB Code, leading to significant compliance failures.


8 fails [5 to 8]


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- Compliance Deficiencies: JPL needed to retain customer identity documents, manage linked transactions, maintain a PEP policy, and appropriately screen customers.
- 6. Monitoring and Controls: Monitoring systems and controls were not comprehensive, and there was a lack of documented procedures for reviewing transactions.
- 7. Reporting and Training: Reports to the Board were limited in scope, and employee training needed to be appropriately tailored to roles and responsibilities.
- Suspicious Activity Reporting: JPL needed to have established proper procedures for investigating and handling internal Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), leading to incomplete documentation and unclear reports to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU).

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













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





































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